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Abstract 
The well-stated fact that institutions matter, according to new institutionalism, is 
the starting point for this thesis. On this basis, institutional change will be the 
focus for the three approaches historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. These approaches however 
focus on different storylines to the same story of institutional change. This thesis 
therefore aims at explaining institutional change of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor through these three approaches of new institutionalism. More specifically, 
how a change in competence post Lisbon has affected the coherence of the EU as 
an international security actor.  
The research also provides a case study follow-up example of how the EU acts 
as an international security actor in the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe post Lisbon. This mixed method is however only a technical approach 
and EU statements in the Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation 
at the OSCE are compiled into data that reveals some differences with reference 
to EU competence.  
The thesis demonstrates that one theoretical approach does not necessarily 
contradict another, but rather should be considered as fruitful encounters when 
explaining EU institutional change and its effects on coherence.  
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1 Introduction 
“Nothing is possible without men, nothing is lasting without institutions” 
Jean Monet 1978 
 
The study of institutions in political science, and international relations has, 
traditionally, largely been based on the Westphalia state system1  (March – Olsen 
1998:946-947). The debate on whether international institutions might enhance 
cooperation between states has been vivid, even though it is not a very 
provocative statement. Another step in that debate is if institutional change further 
would enhance cooperation. Institutionalism scholars have made the argument 
that given that institutions matter, one should expect increased cooperation in 
foreign policy as institutional mechanisms expand and stabilize (Smith 2004: 37). 
A linchpin to the identity of the political science discipline is the study of political 
institutions. Early works in theories of political science emphasized the traditional 
political institutions such as the legal system, economic institutions and the state2.  
      The main focus of these studies was how, and why rules arose, and whether 
the rules worked in favor of the common good. The last couple of decades, 
however, the debate and many faces of institutional perspectives are generically 
recognized as “new institutionalism”, and focus is on what explains the rules and 
practices that comprise the structure of institutions, how they are established, 
sustained and transformed, but also how these rules influence political behavior 
(Dimaggio – Powell 1984:2-3, Lowndes 1996:181, March - Olsen 1998:943-944, 
2005:247-248).  
      In line with this debate, the aim of this paper is to produce a dialogue between 
three approaches of new institutionalism in relation to recent institutional changes 
to the EU as an international security actor. With the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, much attention was drawn to the coherence of the EU as an international 
actor, and a significant change to the institutional set-up underlying EU foreign 
policy was made. Among other novelties introduced3, the High Representative of 
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) are inter alia responsible for the external representation 
that was previously executed by the rotating Presidency. It is for the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) reflected the notion of international political order that not only encompassed 
the European roots but also the rest of the world. The political actor central in this treaty was the territorial, 
sovereign state. 
22 Further reading on early works of theories focusing on traditional political institutions is sociologist Max 
Weber, economist Thorstein Veblen, and political scientist W.W. Willoughby. 
3 E.g. the appointed Presidency of the European Council, 
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abovementioned reasons an excellent opportunity to analyze the EU’s role as an 
international actor, with a new set of competences, using new institutionalism.  
 
1.1 Relevance and previous research 
Depending on whether a researcher is a political scientist, economist, or 
sociologist, new institutionalism can be viewed differently, and it has therefore 
been argued that it is a question of ‘many new institutionalisms’ (Lecours 
2005:18). Even within political science the argument has been made that it is 
rather a question of renewed institutionalism instead of a new institutionalism 
since the adversative frameworks simply share the notion that institutions matter 
(Hay - Wincott 1998:3-4). One of the fundamental differences among the 
approaches in new institutionalism, as mentioned above, is how they view change. 
Whether institutional change is recognized as part of ordinary institutional life, or 
as an exception to the rule of stability.  
      Central to the refocus of (new) institutionalism in contemporary political 
science is research by James March and Johan P. Olsen (1984, 1989, 1994, 1996).  
March and Olsen opposed the theoretical focus on individualistic assumptions in 
political science, and feared the disregard of collective choice and political values. 
Instead of regarding political processes as aggregative, and institutions as a 
contractual form for organizations, March and Olsen suggests an integrative 
political process, and that institutions express ’logic of appropriateness’ that 
influence behavior rather than ‘logic of consequentiality’. Accordingly, if an 
institution effectively influence the behavior of its members, it is more likely that 
the members will consider whether the actions reflect the institution rather than 
considering what the consequences will be for the members themselves  (Peters 
2005: 25-27, Lecours 2005: 27, Peters 2012: 30).  
      Critics of have pointed to its inability to explain change due to a lack of 
explanatory factors, and also that it brings nothing new to the table. Moreover, 
arguments pointing to the lack of new institutionalism to present a unique 
theoretical framework of analysis are put forward (Kraatz – Zajac 1996: 831, 
Georges 2001: 151). Some scholars advocate altogether embracing one approach 
of new institutionalism specifically because of their ontological differences (Hay - 
Wincott 1998:7), whereas other scholars argue the need for greater interchange 
between the three approaches, despite their differences, to attain creative 
combinations drawing on strengths of each approach (Taylor – Hall 1996, Thelen 
1999: 370, 380, Hall: 2010: 220).  
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1.2 Motivation  
New institutionalism should not be considered as belonging to one school of 
thought, instead it can be broadly branched into three approaches4: historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
(Koelbe 1995, Hall – Taylor 1996:936, Lecours 2005:16). What brings these 
different approaches together is categorically thin, and the revival of the study of 
institutions in political science partly sprung from a common reaction to the 
individualistic approaches of behavioralism, in which individuals are assumed to 
act autonomously, and not constrained by formal, neither informal institutions. 
But it was also in line of understanding the nature of continuity and change, since 
institutions gave way for the opportunity, or incentive for behavior to change 
(Hall – Taylor 1996:936, Rhodes 2006: xiii). Consequently, the joint key factor to 
new institutionalism is the fact that institutions matter; the debate is to what extent 
they do so, and what the effects of institutional change might be. In line with this 
reasoning, one could also argue that the institutions brings different traditions in 
political science together and provides for the evolution of these approaches as a 
whole.  
The debate on new institutionalism has partly been on whether it could, based 
on such a small common denominator, and with such different social ontologies, 
be forged into what some call a super-institutionalism, but also the possible value 
of such a hybrid check-list of institutional insights (Hay –Wincott 1998: 5, 
Aspinwall – Schneider 2000:2-3).  
For above-mentioned reasons, this paper contemplates the three approaches as 
being part of the same story (institutional change), but telling a different storyline, 
and highlighting different processes within that story. The meaning of this being 
that the insight of one approach does not necessarily contradict, nor has to falsify 
the insights of another approach, but should instead be contemplated as enriching 
and fruitful encounters. 
1.2.1 Aim and research problem 
The purpose of this paper is to draw from these differences of the three 
approaches, in order to understand possible effects of institutional change.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 It should be noted that other approaches exist within new institutionalism, e.g. constructivist institutionalism, 
network institutionalism and normative institutionalism. 
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The type of institutional change in the limelight here is a change in 
competence, the abovementioned novelties of external representation introduced 
with the Lisbon Treaty, i.e. the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR), and the European External Action Service (EEAS).  
As the guiding principle for foreign policy in the EU, as well as in relation to 
other international actors, is coherence, one might expect that a change in 
competences consequently somehow will influence the coherence of the foreign 
policy of the EU. 
Furthermore, given that a multifaceted approach reveals issues from different 
angles, it is fruitful for further research that might generate complimentary 
insights to the process of institutional change, and how a change in competence 
might affect the coherence of the EU as an international security actor. 
 
Based on the reasoning above, the research questions guiding this thesis:  
 
− How does the three approaches of new institutionalism explain 
institutional change in EU foreign policy?  
− Given that institutions matter, how has a change in competence affected 
the coherence of the EU as an international security actor?   
1.3 Ideal types 
Based on the theoretical chapter, an important note that differentiates the three 
approaches of new institutionalism is how they consider what one could call the  
’lifecycle’ of institutions, whereof stability and change are part of this. What then 
guides the lifecycle of institutions and change, whether it is the result of critical 
junctures (historical institutionalism), strategic action (rational choice 
institutionalism) or norm-driven behaviour (sociological institutionalism), differs 
between the three approaches.  
Because of the existence of various strands within each presented approach, 
and for the purpose of clarification for the analysis, ideal types are presented 
following each theoretical presentation. An ideal type is extreme versions of a 
phenomenon, in this case the theoretical approaches of new institutionalism 
presented in the theoretical chapter. The purpose of this is to highlight the 
characteristics by pointing out what is typical for each approach, and to provide an 
analytical toolkit for the analysis (Esaiasson 2007:158, Teorell – Svensson 
2007:43). 
1.4 Outline  
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In order to answer the research problem in the best possible way, the research 
proceeds in three steps. First, the three approaches of new institutionalism, 
focusing on their take on institutional change, will be presented. Each theory 
section will conclude with an ideal type in order to facilitate and clarify the 
analytical chapter.       
      By way of applying the three approaches of new institutionalism in the next 
coming chapter to the development of EU foreign policy and competence as 
designed in the novelties HR and EEAS, the author hopes to shed some light upon 
a possible dialogue between these three approaches.  
       The final chapter, is a case study of follow-up nature on the coherence of the 
EU as an international security actor in another international organisation, namely 
the OSCE.  
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2 Methodology 
Important acknowledgment before deciding on a methodology is that different 
methods have different strengths, and often enough one method’s strength is the 
weakness of another and vice versa (Teorell – Svensson 2007: 273).  
      The course of action for this study therefore incorporates two methodologies, 
qualitative and quantitative – thus a mixed method design. This approach is not 
without controversy, because of epistemological differences attached to 
quantitative and qualitative methods alike. The position of this thesis is 
nonetheless more technical approach to combining methodologies, and 
consequently views these two as compatible (Bryman 2012: 631). Methodological 
aspects and motivation for certain choices in this research is accounted for below.  
 
2.1 Research design – a mixed methodology  
The thesis thus has two methodological parts. The first qualitative, consisting of a 
descriptive case study of institutional change to the EU external representation 
post Lisbon, videlicet the HR, and the EEAS through the lenses of three 
approaches of new institutionalism. Consequently, the aspects of the institutional 
change to EU foreign policy, needs to be accounted for. But also possible effects 
of the set-up of underlying institutional design to the EU foreign policy. By 
applying the three approaches of new institutionalism, and key concepts of how 
institutional change in competence occur and whether the increase of 
institutionalization actually might result in greater coherence of the EU as an 
international security actor. In order to understand the institutional development 
of the EU, one needs to look into possible explanatory factors to why EU calls for 
greater coherence in its foreign policy, which is accounted for by the approach of 
Historical institutionalism. This will function as helpful tools for structuring this 
part of the analysis.  
      The second, quantitative part is then applied and used a step further down the 
abstraction ladder, to the EU presence at the OSCE, where EU statements in the 
decision-making bodies of Permanent Council and Forum for Security 
Cooperation at the OSCE are examined. The principle argument for this is to look 
at the coherence of EU foreign policy in another multilateral organisation, post 
Lisbon. The quantitative part in this mixed research design is thus considered to 
be of a complementary and follow-up nature, as it is meant to “evaluate and 
interpret results from a principally qualitative study” (Morgan 1998:368), in this 
  8 
case to shed light on whether there has been signs of greater coherence in the 
specific case of EU representation at the OSCE. 
      Both qualitative and quantitative research incorporates goals of describing and 
explaining. It is essential in research to have both, scholars that describe the world 
as well as those who set out to explain it. This relationship is however interactive 
since some descriptions might lead to new causal explanations as well as they in 
turn may result in looking at descriptions in other parts of the world or areas 
(King 1994:34).  
      Critique to qualitative studies often point to the difficulty to replicate them, 
since it relies much on the researcher. Another aspect is the difficulty of 
generalization drawn from qualitative studies, and since it might be troublesome 
to apply one situation to another it is an understandable critique. The primary 
purpose for qualitative studies is characterized as focusing on insights, and 
understanding the ‘why’ (Teorell – Svensson 2007:150-151). 
 
2.2 Case study & output 
The reason for using a case study for this research is because it provides a way of 
looking at indicators of concepts as specified by the theoretical framework 
(George – Bennet 2005: 19). In this case of research how institutional change is 
explained and analysed according to the three approaches of new institutionalism.     
The relationship between theory and research is either deductive, meaning that 
theory guides research, or it is inductive which means that theory is the outcome 
of research (Bryman 2012:19). The case in point here is the former, deductive. 
And as is outlined in the following theoretical chapter, HI conceptualizes 
institutional change as being path dependent, and focus on possible unintended 
consequences thereof, RCI focus on transaction costs of institutional change, and 
finally SI considers institutional change as a form of isomorphism.  
Why a follow-up case on the OSCE? The reason for choosing this 
organization is partly because of the sheer size, in terms of participating States, 
but also in the organization’s broad security concept. Another factor is the 
organization’s political and decision-making bodies, as well as operational 
structures that are designed to promote dialogue on a wide array of topics and 
situations. With 57 participating States, whereof 27 members of the EU, the latter 
make up for almost half of the members. Consequently, if acting coherently, the 
EU has the possibility to be a prominent international security actor (Pourchot 
2011: 184).  
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2.2.1 Material and data 
The qualitative part of the study, as it analyse the institutional development of EU 
foreign policy, official documents, such as Treaty texts, Council decisions, 
statements as well as press releases that are important in order to connect the 
theoretical approaches to empirical data. In order to understand the reasoning 
behind institutional development and treaty revisions, it is also significant to study 
the course of intergovernmental conferences (IGC). Taken together, these 
resources are used in order to find empirical evidence, as well as the rationale 
behind decisions, that can be connected to the theoretical approaches of new 
institutionalism (King 1994:227).  
In addition to the primary sources, a balance of secondary sources such as 
books, academic articles, publications from think tanks, as well as some few news 
articles have been used. An important aspect when dealing with both primary and 
secondary sources is to keep in mind who the author is, for what intentions it was 
produced and to whom it is addressed (Bergström – Boréus 2005: 23-24).  
Certain criteria to mention when conducting social research are the concepts 
of reliability and validity. Reliability deals with the question of whether the results 
of a study are repeatable, if a measure is stable (Teorell – Svensson 2007:55, 
Bryman 2012:46-47). Validity, in short, concerns the integrity of the conclusions 
drawn from research, if what is intended to be measured actually is measured. The 
author hopes to obtain this validity criteria by thoroughly exercising precise and 
thorough formulations.  
2.2.1.1. Statistics of EU statements at the OSCE 
In this study, the quantitative data used is EU statements in a multilateral 
organization, more precisely statements by the EU in the Permanent Council and 
in the Forum for Security Cooperation at the OSCE. The results presented is thus 
repeatable, and the statements are available at the official website of Delegation of 
the European Union to the International Organizations in Vienna.  
      The statements are compiled and structured by the author into measurable data 
in an excel table that is presented in graphs. A limitation to this quantitative study 
of EU statements is that it only covers the years from 2011 until 2013-05-16. 
However the justification is that in order to investigate whether, through an 
example from EU foreign policy in an international organization, act coherently 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. As previously stated, it is a sample 
and follow-up study so as to be able to see how, and what impact (if any) a change 
in competence has generated to the coherence of the EU as an international 
security actor.  
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2.3 Definitions 
In this section concepts used will be defined as to avoid ambiguity on how they 
are used and what they incorporate for this particular study.  
      As of the 1 December 2009, the European Union acts as the legal successor of 
the European Community (TEU art. 1), and the previous confusion of having two 
actors on the international stage is no more. The notion of EU as an international 
actor is a rather well established fact and has been focus for numerous foreign 
policy analysts as well as political scientists5, the question of how to define the 
EU as an actor has however been approached differently. This thesis take on the 
EU is a rather broad understanding, which covers the EU both in a narrower sense 
(one or more EU institutions), as well as the collective of EU member states. 
Nonetheless recognizing the fact that some scholars regard the EU as an 
international organisation in itself, whereas others regard this feature ancient 
history, and instead explores how the EU has developed policies, and what impact 
they might have, in (other) international organisations (Jørgensen – Wessel 2011: 
274, Sari 2012: 60). With this background, the division of areas in competence as 
well as the fact that many policy areas not only fall under one set of competences 
has been intensified by the divide between the economic and political dimension 
of the EU. As the EU increasingly has developed its presence as an international 
actor, its internal divisions have shone through, resulting in hitches of credibility 
as a coherent actor (Edwards – Rijks 2008: 21-22).  
Moving on to the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. Coherence can be 
understood as legal procedural obligation to be followed by political action. The 
political action subsequently needs to be coordinated by actors in European 
foreign policy in order to have a coherent EU foreign policy. If not, internal forces 
would produce a clash and whirlwind of different external policies (Portela – 
Raube 2009:4).  
Coherence is a precondition for an effective foreign policy. The prime 
objective for EU foreign policy is to be able to deliver effective policy outputs 
that member states cannot deliver individually. Even though effectiveness does 
not always go hand in hand with EU achieving unanimity in foreign policy, 
coherence is nonetheless perceived as legitimizing EU foreign policy (Portela – 
Raube 2009:4, Koehler 2010: 57). The debate surrounding the concepts of 
coherence and effectiveness is tremendously wide. One can speak of different 
types of effectiveness, but for the purpose of this research it is the effectiveness in 
acting collectively (Jørgensen 2011: 603).    
Another important note in this wide ranged debate is that the English version 
of the TEU addresses the need for enhanced consistency in EU external action, 
whereas legal scholars almost unanimously agree on the distinction between the 
principles of coherence and consistency. The problem is partly of a linguistic and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 For further research on EU ’actorness’ Smith 2008 
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semantic nature, since different language versions of the Treaties (TEU and 
TFEU) use different terminology. At least one distinction to be made here is that 
consistency, in the legal sense, refers to primary law and the assurance that 
different EU policies do not contradict each other, i.e. they are consistent. The 
concept of coherence then, conversely connotes a wider meaning and refers to 
unity as a whole in foreign policy of the EU (Cremona 2008: 13, Duke 2011: 17-
18, Blockmans – Laatsit 2012: 138). For the purpose of this thesis, and in spite of 
the language used in the (English version) TEU, the concept used hereinafter is 
coherence.   
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Theoretical framework 
New institutionalism can generally be presented as proposing a methodology for 
research. What this methodology then offers is various research questions and 
orientations rather than offering a grand macro theory model. As previously 
mentioned, the basic assumption is that institutions matter. Thus the starting point 
for analysis is institutions, and the fact that they are an autonomous force in 
politics, as their weight effect action and outcomes. Each of the three new 
institutionalisms tackle institutional change differently, and therefore the focus of 
the overview below (Bulmer 1998: 368, Gorges 2001: 156, Lecours 2005:8). 
2.4 From old to new institutionalism 
The name new institutionalism implies the existence of a previous 
institutionalism, and what today, retrospectively, is called old institutionalism 
focused mainly on institutions as material structures, and individualistic 
assumptions (Lecours 2005:6).  
      Political philosophers in the old days identified and analyzed the success, or 
lack thereof, of formal institutions that were developed for the purpose of the 
collective good, and then made recommendations for the design for future 
institutions. From Hobbes and the focus on strong institutions, to save people 
from their worst instincts, to Locke who developed a more contractarian notion of 
public institutions, or Montesquieu who identified the need for balance in political 
structures (Peters 1999:3). The point to be made from these political thinkers is 
that it paved the way for political science systematic analysis of institutions, and 
their impact on society. 
      Since new institutionalism is not an approach designed to describe institutions, 
and how they work, but more in the line of explaining the process and political 
outcomes, it is important to note that these strands of different positions reflect a 
larger debate within political science (Taylor – Hall 1996: 936). This is revealed 
by the different ways institutions are defined according to the three approaches: 
 
 
Historical 
Intuitionalism 
Formal, or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the 
polity or political economy.  
Rational choice 
Institutionalism 
In materialist terms, but also rules that govern the political 
game, creating opportunities as well as imposing constraints. 
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Sociological 
Institutionalism  
Formal rules, procedures or norms, as well as the symbol 
systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide 
the frames of meaning guiding human action. 
(Taylor – Hall 1996) 
In the next coming sections each approach of new institutionalism will be 
presented, with focus on their take on institutional change.  
2.5 Historical institutionalism (HI) 
Generally, HI associates institutions with formal organisations as well as informal 
rules and procedures that structure conduct. Norms and values are considered to 
emanate from material institutions, and their function in these formal structures is 
important. In that sense, it is the institutions that actually shape political outcome 
since they structure political situations (Thelen – Steinmo 1998: 2, Taylor – Hall 
1996: 938).  
      Political actors, according to HI, are considered to follow societally defined 
rules, even though not necessarily directly for the sake of self-interest. With this 
follows wherefrom preferences emanate, correspondingly strategies as well as 
goals pursued by actors are shaped endogenously, by institutional context. At the 
heart of HI lies the notion of a historically based analysis in order to reveal why 
actors emphasize certain goals and preferences over others (Thelen – Steinmo 
1998: 9). This structural approach acknowledges the autonomy of the political 
arena, but simultaneously taking into account previously introduced policy. The 
study of institutions in HI thus reveals how institutions influence the outcome of 
structural processes, setting the constraints but also shaping political strategies 
and influence political outcome, even though the institutions not being considered 
as the sole cause (Thelen – Steinmo 1998:7).   
      Critique to HI approach has been the lack of what some would call ‘universal 
toolkit’ that characterizes other deductive theoretical approaches6. Some scholars 
even call it simple storytelling, however the response to this critique is that each 
approach has weaknesses and strengths based on different assumptions and logics, 
and the wise route for fruitful research is consequently to explore these. 
2.5.1 Path dependence & unintended consequences 
In the words of North (1990:3):  
 
“Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is 
the key to understanding historical change”. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 E.g. rational choice institutionalism 
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Continuity is a central element in HI, and accordingly an apparent change is in 
fact only concealing underlying continuity. When presenting change, HI put it 
forward as a situation of formative period and in moments of crisis, rather than 
purely evolutionary (Hay - Wincott 1998:15-16).  
      Central to HI is path dependence that entails a dynamic process of self-
reinforcing. By way of example, when an organization or institution embarks on a 
path (institution is formed or policy is initiated), the initial policy choices tend to 
persist, and positive feedback reinforces that particular path (Thelen 1999:387-
388, Peters 2005:71). Institutional change, according to HI, is a result of 
unintended consequences due to these ‘critical junctures’ when considerable 
institutional change take place, and the institution embark on a new historical 
path. This branching point of critical juncture reveals that it presupposes that an 
institution exists in a constant equilibrium state. A bit misleading concept though, 
since the approach does allow for change, through a discrete process but also 
when responding to new information and thus a process of learning and capable to 
move among equilibrium (Lowndes 2002: 105, Peters – Pierre – King 
2005:1276).  
      The effects of critical junctures are mostly argued to be filling a political 
space, and are difficult to alter or reverse. Positive feedback or factors, even the 
smallest ones, are then considered to provide advantage, and most likely to 
produce a scenario of self-enforcing. This is also commonly claimed to happen in 
issue areas that are not yet well established. If institutional change does take 
place, according to HI, it is most likely incremental change and not radical. 
Furthermore, new institutions, through a process of layering, will be created on 
top of stable institutions, or through conversions where old institutions are 
remodelled but for new purposes  (Hall – Taylor 1996: 942, Thelen 1999: 388-
390, Stacey – Rittberger 2003: 867-868, Peters 2012: 20-21).  
       From the get go, HI was not considered to present very convincing arguments 
on institutional change. This is also the area that traditionally receives most 
criticism within HI, of being unduly static, and not able to predict change. This 
conversely does not have to be its downfall, since post-dicting changes in a more 
descriptive manner is also fruitful, instead of or as a aim 
ement to explanatory and predicting approaches. The debate on HI has however 
evolved in this regard, and tackles change as exogenous factors that generate 
sufficient political pressure for change to occur. Some scholars even argue this 
being the strength of HI, as it therefore duly can be integrated with the majority of 
approaches in new institutionalism (Peters 2012: 79). 
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Table 1. Ideal type of HI 
 
 Historical institutionalism 
Scientific world 
view: 
Modified egoism; structured by common 
agreement. As the name suggests, history matters in 
the sense that history explains stability and 
continuity.  
General approach: Order and stability, as well as timing and sequence are important factors. 
Define institutions: 
Formal, or informal procedures, routines, norms 
and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy.  
Actors 
intentionality: 
Functional need and convenience, possible 
shortcuts. Self-reflective. 
Explains 
institutional change: 
External factors, such as political or environmental 
pressure, change can be a cumulative process 
where previous decisions provide the basis for new 
decisions. Therefore, initial institutional and policy 
decisions tend to persist, and be ‘sticky’. Change 
might also be a process of learning, as it responds 
to new information generated from experiences.  
Path dependence: 
A self-enforcing process, where initial policy 
choices tend to persist. Positive feedback enforcing 
the path, increasing returns in forms of stability and 
continuity.  
Critical junctures: 
An institutional crisis can be the result of either 
endogenous or exogenous factors that lead to a 
critical juncture. It is a formative process stemming 
from uncertainty, which presents various 
alternative routes to embark upon.  
Unintended 
consequences: 
Critical junctures might trigger and result in 
unintended consequences that set the institution on 
a new path.  
 
This ideal type of HI is derived from the theory chapter above, and thus from 
the following sources: Hall – Taylor 1996, Hay - Wincott 1998, Thelen – Steinmo 
1998, Peters 1999, Thelen 1999, Aspinwall – Schneider 2001, Lowndes 2002, 
Stacey – Rittberger 2003, Peters 2005, Peters 2012. 
2.6 Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
Rational choice can be contemplated as an umbrella of theoretical approaches, 
wherein all subscribe to basic assumptions on the nature of actors, preferences and 
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institutional or strategic settings in which they interact. The basis for analysis 
within rational choice approaches can be actors, organisations or states. Originally 
political scientists within RCI were inspired by economics and organizational 
studies, and motivated by concepts that emphasised property rights and 
transaction costs. RCI reintroduced the study of institutions to rational choice in 
political science as well as in international relations, and developed at the same 
time, but relatively isolated from historical institutionalism. According to RCI, 
actors have a fixed set of preferences and behave accordingly to maximize, and 
strategically, in order to attain these preferences (Taylor – Hall 1996: 942-945, 
Pollack 2007:32-33, Peters 2012: 47).  
      Institutions according to RCI are associated with material structures, and the 
rules of the political game. These rules then provide for opportunities as well as 
set constraints on the strategic, calculating actors. Hence not so much focus on 
what institutions are but rather what they represent, which is equilibrium, that in 
turn encompass a pattern of behaviour as a result of mutual expectations on how 
others will act. The emergence and survival of institutions are due to the fact that 
they fulfil the function for the actors affected by the institutions (Lecours 2005:6, 
16, 18, Jönsson – Tallberg 2008: 89, Peters 2012:52).  
      Snidal divides the critique to rational choice in international relations to 
internal and external. First, internal criticism still accepts the basics to the 
approach; however the debate is on how rational choice is used in methodological 
terms. One of the main internal critiques is the questioning of empirical 
application of rational choice models. The argument being that empirical work by 
rational choice scholars has severe methodological failings, and consequently 
little to contribute to the study of international relations. Second, the external 
critique then identifies flaws in the approach as a whole. Main argument by 
scholars are ‘ontological blind spots’, due to the fact that rational choice 
emphasize certain issues over others by pure assumption, and therefore end up 
with an inaccurate view of the empirical world (Snidal 2002: 73-74, Pollack 2007: 
35). 
2.6.1 Strategy to reduce transaction costs 
According to RCI, institutions change when they become dysfunctional, or do not 
generate optimum results. Institutional equilibrium is thus considered as the norm, 
and mostly it is argued that ‘business as usual’ is when actors seek to maximise 
their benefits within the institutional context and the institution is held constant. In 
this view of RCI, institutional change is a consequence of strategic action by 
actors deciding to remodel because of endogenous malfunctions since the rules of 
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the game changed and the institutions needs to follow suit7 (Lecours 2005:12, 16, 
Rittberger – Stacey 2003: 1022, Fioretos 2011:373).  
      Institutional change, due to exogenous factors, is thus institutional 
modification as actors realise that the benefits for change outweighs the costs and 
steadily moving towards a new equilibrium. The transaction cost of change refers 
to the actual change and operating it, and this incorporates the costs of learning 
how to operate within a new structure, as well as the cost that follows with the 
uncertainty of operating in a new structure. One aspect to reducing transaction 
cost is the need for selective incentives so as to receive acceptance and 
compliance. Another aspect to minimise collective action problems is to design 
institutions accordingly to reduce transaction costs among actors and between 
institutions. A point to be made here though is that policy makers can use it to 
‘lock in’ their preferences (Koremenos – Lipson – Snidal 2001:782, Hira – Hira 
2000: 270, Lowndes 2002:105).  
 
Table 2. Ideal Type of RCI 
 
 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Scientific world 
view: 
Key notions are individualism, optimizing, and 
strategic behaviour.  
General approach: 
Institutions are important in the context of strategic 
and calculating actors, as to constrain their 
behaviour. How structure influence behaviour and 
policy. 
Define institutions: 
Institutions are associated with material structures, 
and the rules of the political game, that provide 
opportunity as well as set the constraint for 
strategic and calculating actors.  
Actors 
intentionality: 
Actors have a set of preferences and behave 
strategically and accordingly as to maximize the 
fulfilment of these preferences.  
Explains 
institutional change: 
Strategic actors decide to remodel institutions only 
when they become dysfunctional, or do not 
generate optimal results, due to a change in the 
rules and henceforth the institutions must follow 
suit. 
Strategies: 
Utility-maximizing actors with strategic 
preferences based on self-interest. Since institutions 
set the structural context wherein actors pursue 
their strategies, they are of great importance.   
Transaction costs: In order to lessen collective action problems, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 This is called Nash Equilibrium, when ”a set of strategies, one for each player, with the property that no player 
can improve her or his position by changing to some other strategy (assuming other players stick to their initial 
strategies)” (Shepsle 2006:25) 
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institutions and structures can be designed as to 
reduce transaction costs.  
 
This ideal type of RCI is developed from the presented theoretical chapter 
above, and thus the following sources are used: Taylor – Hall 1996, Koremenos – 
Lipson – Snidal 2001, Snidal 2002, Lecours 2005, Hira – Hira 2000, Lowndes 
2002, Rittberger – Stacey 2003, Pollack 2007, Jönsson – Tallberg 2008, Fioretos 
2011, Peters 2012. 
2.7 Sociological institutionalism (SI) 
This approach, as revealed by its name, stem from sociology, more specifically 
form the subfield of organisational theory8. A distinctive difference to political 
scientist approaches is that SI tend to define institutions much broader, to also 
include symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates as these provide 
the ‘frames of meaning’ that guides human action. Instead of focusing on the 
historic (HI) or strategic (RCI) dimension of institutions, SI brings forward the 
cognitive. If RCI emphasise that actors seek to maximise benefits, SI in contrast 
emphasise that actors seek to act appropriate according to institutionalized 
practices of a collective, and bestowing a shared understanding of what is true and 
reasonable, expressing identity in sociologically appropriate ways. It is thus 
suggested that institutions shape actors perceptions, and with this follows 
behaviour favouring reproduction of institutions. (Hall – Taylor 1996:946-947, 
949, Lecours 2005:17, Olsen 2007:3).  
      Institutions and culture, consistent with SI, are thus closely associated with 
one another since agent and structure are inseparable. Given that actions can only 
be explained and understood in relation to the cognitive and culturally informed 
institutions in the environmental context in which they exist (Aspinwall – 
Schneider 2000: 9). According to this understanding, institutions are the collective 
outcomes of social constructions based on shared cultural understandings of how 
the world works. SI thus emphasise “logic of appropriateness” as environmental 
context plays a seminal role in actions taken within an institutional context 
(Thelen 1999: 386, Pollack 2009: 127).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 The previously mentioned contribution to new institutionalism in political science by March and Olsen reflects 
debates on institutions in sociology, and can therefore be viewed as a subfield to SI. March and Olsen’s approach 
in political science is sometimes ascribed normative institutionalism, but for the purpose of this thesis the term 
used is sociological institutionalism. 
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2.7.1 The garbage can approach and isomorphism 
Since the study of institutions in SI lies much in the actual process of 
institutionalisation, one could argue that institutional change is a natural 
component in this approach. Hence, institutions are not static, and change occurs 
through either institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation. A more functionalist 
view within SI is that institutions find the means of adapting to exogenous 
environmental changes (Olsen 2007: 9, Peters 2012: 139-140).  
March and Olsen introduced the concept of garbage can model, that connotes 
multiple repertoires kept in stock for an institution when searching for solutions to 
a problem, or when in need to adjust policies. Institutional change thus occurs 
when the repertoire of possible solutions in the garbage can run out, and steps for 
adjustments are taken in accordance with the logic of appropriateness. On the 
basis of this argument, institutional change is not planned but rather the result of 
various streams of activity and opportunities for the proper action according to the 
conceptions of society (March – Olsen 1996: 251-252, Peters 2012: 27, 36).    
A central concept to understand the stimuli for institutional change in SI is 
isomorphism that suggests convergence. Two sources for isomorphic change is 
identified in this context: mimetic and normative. The basic argument for mimetic 
isomorphism is how institutions identify and adapt to changing circumstances and 
environmental context. Mimetic isomorphism is triggered by uncertainty, and 
organizations may model themselves on other organisations when goals are 
ambiguous or if the environment somehow creates symbols of uncertainty. One 
explanation could be the recognition of success of another (institution) and thus it 
is the appropriate (or strategic) course of action to take, or due to condition of 
uncertainty. A second type of isomorphism, the normative, refers to the process 
where normative pressures are induced due to legitimacy issues, and members of 
certain profession aim at define conditions and methods for their profession in 
order to reach autonomy (DiMaggio – Powell 1991: 66, Radaelli 2000: 28, Gorges 
2001:139).  
Legitimacy is an important concept in SI, since isomorphism is not driven by 
efficiency considerations but rather the rationale of gaining legitimacy. Pursuant 
with this argument then is that societally conformed elements, e.g. to be 
acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, are more important to consider than 
internal efficiency (Hall – Taylor 1996: 949, Radaelli 2000: 27-28, Lecours 2005: 
12-13).  
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Table 3. Ideal Type of SI 
 
 Sociological Institutionalism 
Scientific world 
view: 
Holism, group identity. Shared past and common 
experience.  
General approach: 
Focus is on institutions cognitive ability to shape 
actors perceptions, and institutional environment is 
of importance.  
Define institutions: 
Formal rules, procedures or norms, as well as the 
symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral 
templates that provide the frames of meaning 
guiding actors.  
Actors 
intentionality: 
Actors develop and redefine goals while making 
decisions and adapting to environmental pressures. 
Initial intent can thus be changed, or lost.  
Explains 
institutional change:  
Institutional change is a natural component and 
reveals itself in terms of convergence.  
Isomorphism: 
Stimuli for change are convergence; mimetic 
isomorphism is when an institution identifies, and 
adapt to changing circumstances and environmental 
context. Normative isomorphism is convergence 
due to normative pressures.  
Legitimacy: 
Institutions undergo change in order to approach 
societal reality, i.e. in consonance with social and 
cultural codes.  
 
The ideal type of SI is developed from the above presented theory, thus 
sources used: March – Olsen 1989, DiMaggio – Powell 1991, Thelen 1999, 
Aspinwall – Schneider 2000, Radaelli 2000, Gorges 2001, Lecours 2005, Olsen 
2007, Pollack 2009, Peters 2012 
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3 Analysis  
The EU has gone from an inward-looking foreign policy device9 to pursuing 
global ambitions, as is reflected in the European Security Strategy (2003:14) “An 
active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale”. 
The EU as an international actor is nevertheless a most complex one, since EU 
foreign policy is an aggregate outcome of its never-ending process of 
accommodating internal diversities within the EU itself. This everlasting process 
has been described by some academics as a laboratory of the external policies of 
the EU. With this background, the working progress of the EU is evident, and that 
also goes for the EU as an international actor that dates back to the European 
Community.  
      Let’s therefore begin with a review on the current state of the art of the EU’s 
role as an international security actor. Thereafter, the three approaches of new 
institutionalism will be used as a toolkit for the analysis of institutional change in 
competence, and its effect on the coherence of the EU as an international security 
actor.   
3.1 The EU - a sui generis international actor 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) did not contain much notion of the (at the time) EEC 
involvement in international affairs, except from competence in economic and 
trade. The Treaty did however give legal personality to the EC. Foreign policy 
was thus left for member states alone. But from 1970 onwards, informal systems 
developed under the label European Political Cooperation (EPC), and as 
collaboration on the European level it proved fruitful even in foreign policy. This 
informal system became formalised under the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986, and later the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) set the 
mechanisms for the creation of CFSP, and followed by The Nice Treaty that 
carried the addition of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)10 (Crowe 
2008:11, Piris 2010: 238-239, Duke 2011:26).  
      The ambition of improving coherence and effectiveness of EU’s external 
capabilities was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, by linking the EU’s 
capabilities with CFSP under the principle of coherence. During the course of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 E.g. the Franco-German antagonism, but also the strained relationship between Britain and Ireland (Hill-Smith 
2008:9).  
10 ESDP was renamed CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty 
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time, however limitations were revealed11 whereof some amended in the 
Amsterdam Treaty12 (Smith 2001: 172, 192, Crowe 2008:12, Duke 2011:24-25). 
In the following sections, the three approaches of new institutionalism will be 
applied and used as analytical tools. However the ways in which institutions 
matter differs according to each approach of new institutionalism. First, since a 
main feature for HI is the role of history, this approach will be applied to the 
development of the EU as an international actor up until the Lisbon Treaty. The 
second approach of RCI then picks up how a change in competence as introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty has affected the EU coherence. The third approach of SI 
focus on how institutional change is a natural process where legitimacy is a 
driving force following the logic of appropriateness.  
3.2 Historical Institutionalism – path dependence en 
route?  
Since HI seek to explain institutional choices, and the development of institutions 
over time, this section will therefore apply the theory of HI on the development of 
EU competences and coherence in European foreign policy. Catchwords in this 
theory are timing and sequence, with special focus on continuity. Sequence is 
important as a factor of explaining institutional outcomes (Rittberger – Stacey 
2003: 1023). From the perspective of HI it is thus fruitful to take a look in the 
rear-view mirror concerning the institutional development of European foreign 
policy cooperation.  
There had been previous attempts at creating a European foreign policy13 in 
the past, however transferring military and political power onto the international 
level failed to muster sufficient support14 (Piris 2010: 240, Sari 2012:72). A first 
important note to make here is hence the sensitiveness of the matter. When the 
first informal intergovernmental European Political Cooperation (EPC) meeting 
was held, in the year of 1970, between the six foreign ministers from the 
European Community member states, a number of cautious steps were taken in 
order not to raise alarm on issues of sovereignty and traditional diplomacy (Smith 
2004:71, Strömvik 2005:2, 90-91). Recalling the importance of timing and 
sequence in HI, this reflects why the original informal EPC framework was bound 
by several restrictions, such as no formal links with the European Community, 
neither with the EC Commission. The meetings were not to be held in Brussels 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 E.g. confusion with regard to third parties, since the Commission was responsible for (in short terms) aid and 
trade, whereas CFSP issues was still to be handled by the Presidency. The Commission was ‘fully associated’ 
with CFSP, but not a full-fledged member and could thus not participate since it was still considered strictly 
intergovernmental activities.  
12E.g. the creation of the High Representative for the CFSP that was appointed to Javier Solana. Even though he 
had no institutional authority, the function was to assist the Presidency.  
13 E.g the European Political Community (1954) and the Fouchet plan (1962). 
14 The early attempts were inspired by supranational organizational designs, a sensitive matter for nations.  
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but in the member state holding the presidency, no budget, and a final note of 
caution is reflected in how they were referred to when making common 
statements, namely the Six (not the EC).  
The Luxembourg report was the springboard for formalizing EPC and the 
motivation was twofold. First, it was presented as a way forward for a more 
unified Europe. The second referred to the obligation of Europe to take 
responsibility that comes with economic might (The Luxembourg report).  
A concern for coherence in EC foreign policy was first expressed15 with the 
Single European Act in 1987, at a time when EPC was institutionalized and the 
Community’s external action was expanding:  
 
The external policies of the EC and the policies agreed in EPC must be consistent. 
The Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of competence, shall 
have special responsibility for ensuring that such consistency is sought and 
maintained. 
SEA, Title III, Article 30 
 
It was thus at this point that the coherence requirement was introduced, and 
comprised that the external policies of the EC, as well as the policies agreed in 
EPC should be aligned, ensuring coherence between different competences. 
Mandated to ensure this was the Presidency and the Commission. With time 
however it became clear that the divide between the economic (Community) and 
the political (EPC) diplomacy proved rather dysfunctional (Cremona 2011: 55, 
Gebhard 2011:104).  
In accordance with the concept of path dependence and the fact that HI 
emphasize order and stability, one could here argue that the institutionalization of 
EPC in the SEA was a first step on this path towards common European foreign 
policy, and the notion of coherence was introduced to balance the internal market 
with a foreign policy dimension. As path dependence is a self-enforcing process 
where initial choices tend to persist, this holds true in this context as the informal 
structure was formalized and set into motion. Even though the member states did 
not confer any decision-making powers to the bodies involved in the 
implementation of the EPC, but overall the SEA provided for closer links on the 
organizational level, paving the way for the single institutional framework under 
the Maastricht Treaty (Sari 2012:74). EPC was however repeatedly criticized for 
its limitations, mostly regarding its reactive and declaratory approach. The failed 
attempts to react to international events, and crises nevertheless ended with new 
efforts to improve policy instruments and deepen commitments16. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 Political and institutional coherence was originally introduced in the Merger Treaty in 1965, but this type of 
coherence was mainly between the member states and the Community (Gebhard 2011:103).  
16 There were some success, eg. the six acting together at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europé 
(CSCE, later the OSCE) in 1975.  
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The principle of coherence was consequently institutionalized in the 
Maastricht Treaty17 in 1992, and created a single institutional framework to 
govern all policies. The EPC transformed into the CFSP within the second pillar, 
the Council was entrusted with responsibilities in relation to CFSP, which 
included the possibility to adopt legally binding decisions. The Maastricht Treaty 
also provided for legal instruments, such as joint actions and common positions, 
to function as tools for better cooperation in European foreign policy. A 
clarification on the rather diffusing research area since it contains the three types 
of foreign interactions. First the foreign policy of the EU as prescribed in the 
treaty articles on CFSP, second the EC external relations, and third traditional 
national foreign policy. On paper the institutional linkages in Maastricht provided 
for increased coherence, but since it was the responsibility for both the Council 
and Commission it instead created tension. 
An important milestone on the organizational development though is that the 
Council now could act on behalf of the member states, and it thus reveals a certain 
conferral of power by the member states, and an effort to project itself as an actor 
on the international arena. One aspect that followed the lines of SEA was the 
separation between the CFSP and Community law through the pillar structure, and 
consequently reinforced the already existing dualism between supranational 
integration and intergovernmental cooperation (Aggestam et. al. 2008: 27, 
Wessels – Bopp 2008: 1, Duke 2011: 25, Gebhard 2011:104, Sari 2012: 76).  
Historic events taking place in the years between 1989-1991, including the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
notably these exogenous factors affected international institutions to reform. In 
line with HI, these exogenous events however resulted in institutional debate and 
consequently led to further enhanced cooperation in European foreign policy 
matters (Smith 2003:37, Smith 2004: 176, 210, Edwards 2011: 47). The 
framework for cooperation in CFSP remained primarily intergovernmental, 
generating continuity and stability. The reforms on EU foreign policy mostly 
mirror a continuation on the path chosen when initiating the cooperation through 
EPC, and could accordingly be viewed as (self-enforcing) process of renovation 
and building upon what had been achieved through EPC. The institutional 
changes that came with the Maastricht Treaty, according to HI, is here considered 
as a response to debates and criticism on the previous setup, thus it constitutes a 
process of learning, and a response to new information based on experiences.  
The Amsterdam Treaty was ratified in 1999, and was an amendment to the 
Maastricht Treaty. With it came the introduction of the High Representative for 
CFSP to further improve coherence and external representation. The HR was 
originally set to provide assistance to the Presidency in its external representation 
role, however this relationship turned out to be quite the opposite. Since the HR 
for CFSP was appointed on a multiyear basis, the result was that the six-month 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
17 The Maastricht Treaty is also known as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), however to avoid confusion, 
as the Lisbon Treaty is an amendment to the Maastricht treaty (TEU), in this paper the TEU is used when 
referring to the Lisbon Treaty.  
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rotating Presidency assisted the HR. A common defence policy within the scope 
of CFSP was also incorporated in what was called the Petersberg Tasks that 
indicated what type of operations could be undertaken.  
The Nice Treaty in 2002 mostly focused on a set of Amsterdam leftovers that 
was needed for the upcoming enlargement. It introduced the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP), but was negatively affected by the fact that the 
dualistic logic remained. By and all this treaty revision did little to enhance 
coherence (Aggestam et. al. 2008:30, Gebhard 2011:105).  
In line with how HI view initial institutional and policy decisions to be 
‘sticky’, the competence divisions, and the tensions that came with it, between the 
Community and the EPC (later CFSP) have more or less been constant since the 
institutionalization of EPC through the SEA in 1986. Even though some 
recognition and improvements have been made on the basis on various reports and 
treaty revisions18. This however only strengthens the HI argument of the 
importance of stability and continuity, and perhaps the timing was not yet ready 
for the considerable change needed to address the competence issue that 
inherently affected the incoherence.  
To summarize, the Union has hitherto shown many faces in how it presents 
itself to the rest of the world. The Maastricht Treaty, with CFSP contained in the 
second pillar, the representation fell on the member states and more specifically 
on the member states holding the Presidency of the Council. Followed by the 
amendments in the Amsterdam Treaty, that introduced the HR to assist the 
Presidency in CFSP matters. The other side to the separation of competences is 
the Community, contained in the first pillar to deal with matters of trade and aid, 
where responsibility to speak for the Community was the Commission. Alongside 
we have the member states carrying out bilateral relations, as well as multilateral 
diplomacy through their diplomatic missions. With this as background, the Union 
has over the years had some difficulties in credibility as a coherent actor.  
 To pursue further coherence, the EU has used a number of institutional 
devices in rather creative ways, but also with right timing and sequence, it has 
thus been a self-enforcing process of learning and developing in an orderly and 
stable fashion. What follows next is a discussion whether next step in the 
development of the EU reflects a continuation down the path embarked upon with 
the SEA, or whether the time that followed with uncertainty and unintended 
consequences pushed onto a new path.   
3.2.1 Response to incoherence - a critical juncture?  
Prior to the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, a lack of coherence in EU foreign 
policy was evident, and as the European Security Strategy (ESS) was presented in 
2003 it was thus explicitly stated: “if we are to make a contribution that matches 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
18 The Copenhagen Report (1973), The London Report (1981), and the treaty revisions of Maastricht, and 
Amsterdam.  
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our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable” 
(European Council 2003:12). The report on the implementation of the European 
Security Strategy re-emphasised the need for enhanced coherence, and strategic 
thinking (European Council 2008:2), but also added a number of growing 
challenges19 that needed a collective approach. These documents not only called 
for a united EU approach to the increasing challenges, but were also a way of 
promoting the EU as an effective and coherent actor on the global stage. 
Important to note in this regard is that without any clear objectives about what the 
EU is trying to achieve, it will remain incoherent despite institutional reforms 
trying to enhance coherence (Duke 2011:31).  
      A process that began with the Laeken Declaration, and the decision that the 
next preparation for an intergovernmental conference (IGC)20 was to be prepared 
by a Convention, making the process more democratic. The Convention came up 
with a draft Treaty in 2003 establishing a Constitution for Europe, bringing all the 
previous treaty amendments together and replaced them with one single text, with 
the aim ‘One Treaty, One Legal Personality and One Pillar’. It was subsequently 
considered a political earthquake when two of the founding member states, the 
Netherlands and France, had negative referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005. What was so controversial about the Constitutional Treaty for it to stir such 
a rigorous debate? To mention a few red flags, the symbolic vocabulary in the 
treaty and mentioning of a flag, anthem, and foreign minister – wordings that had 
connotations of a transformation of the EU into a state like creature. In reality, the 
actual legal content of the treaty would not necessarily have revolutionized the 
role of the EU, nor its relationship with the member states. 
      Another important factor to consider at this time is the 2004 enlargement of 
ten new members in one go, that in itself puts a strain on the institutional 
machinery. Previous enlargement processes between 1973 and 1995 had taken 
place gradually, leaving enough time for new entrants to get into the system, but 
also for the EU to steadily adapt. The 2004 enlargement proved different as 
uncertainty on how the sheer number of new entrants would affect the EU 
(Meunier – McNamara 2007:11, Piris 2010:21, 31-32, Dehousse – Magnette 
2012:33). The failure of the Constitutional Treaty meant that the Union was left 
with the institutional design as carved by the Nice Treaty.  
      Bringing attention to the HI concept of critical juncture at this point, because 
of a period of uncertainty due to endogenous as well as exogenous factors, a 
formative period where alternative paths were considered. A number of events, 
the European Convention and the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, reflect a 
questioning of the legitimacy of the EU, which stem from the notion that its 
working methods are legitimized through institutional design (Webber 2011:211). 
What then followed was a period of reflection, and a climate of distrust but also a 
sense that European Union was at a crossroads was evident (Piris 2010:14, 23-25, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 To name a few: the global financial crisis, energy security and cyber security 
20 IGCs is the usual method of negotiating amendments to the Treaties. It is diplomatic conferences between 
representatives of the governments of the Member States. 
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European Convention). On this note, and in accordance with the HI concept of 
unintended consequences due to external events, this set back did not allow for the 
full institutional change and start of a new path for the European Union. The 
institutional change can instead be explained what HI explains as gradual and 
evolutionary change, as an answer to dysfunctional elements that generated a need 
of an improvement. Another aspect to mention in line with HI reasoning here is 
the importance of stability and continuity. As such, the various references in the 
Constitutional Treaty to state like features proved too much and a too big of a step 
into deep waters of uncertainty.  
      The rather painful, almost a decade long Treaty review process hence resulted 
in a more traditional approach to treaty reform, namely to amend already existing 
treaties. As is clearly stated in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty, and a recurrent 
theme all through the treaty reform process, an objective for conclusion was to 
improve the EU’s role in the world:   
 
…to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty 
of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the 
Union and to improving the coherence of its action. 
(TEU: preamble) 
 
Nevertheless, some features in the Constitutional Treaty did survive, and 
incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty but presented less controversially. Including the 
legal personality of the EU as a whole21 (not only the European Community), but 
also the HR22 and European External Action Service, designed with the ambition 
to enable the EU to take the stage with greater coherence and influence as an 
international actor (Koehler 2010: 58, Duke 2011: 29-30). Granting the EU legal 
personality (Article 47 TEU) is also in line with enhancing coherence and 
visibility as an international actor. With the ambition for the EEAS, to function as 
a one-stop shop for the partners of the EU, in the words of the HR Ashton  “The 
aim of all this is to forge a better, more coherent policy, developing European 
answers to complex global problems, working with our partners around the 
world” (Europe Day 9 May, 2011).  
There is thus less confusion for third parties as the EU, as of 1st December 
2009, acts as the legal successor of the EC  (Jørgensen – Wessel 2011: 261-262), 
with this notion of legal competences, one could go further in stipulating that legal 
framework creates political possibilities, but also set boundaries for action by the 
EU (Wessel 2011: 621). The previous pillar structure of the EU was removed in 
the Lisbon Treaty, but there is nonetheless one leftover, which is the separation of 
CFSP from the rest of EU activities and policies.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
21 In the past it was only the Community that had legal personality, however with the Lisbon Treaty it is possible 
for the Union to enter international agreements under CFSP as well.  
22 The HR, that in the Constitutional treaty was proposed the title union minister for foreign affairs, was 
renegotiated during the process leading up to the Lisbon Treaty for the purpose of member states fear of losing 
national sovereignty (Verola 2012:44). 
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This reflects that even though a formal abolishment of the pillar structure took 
place, member states were still not ready to fully let go of the difference between 
external (economic) relations and CFSP (Piris 2010:242, Laursen 2007: 7-8).  
The heretofore-mentioned concept within HI, that initial policy tends to persist 
and ‘stick’, is such an example. All in all, the latest institutional changes that 
came with the Lisbon Treaty did not end up reflecting a critical juncture resulting 
in an entirely new path. Instead it represents a process of learning from 
experiences since the formalization of EPC, but also the need of stability and 
continuity  
3.3 Rational Choice Institutionalism – a clear-cut 
strategy for EU competence in foreign policy?  
According to RCI, actors decide to change institutions when they no longer 
generate optimal results. The actors involved thus behave strategically to optimize 
self-interest. Institutions are important as they set the rules of the political game, 
both in creating opportunities as well as setting constraints.  
      Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, foreign policy was carried out by three actors, and 
subsequently not the best circumstances for turning EU economic power into 
political power. With this in mind, the two main institutional changes introduced 
with the Lisbon Treaty in the area of external affairs the ‘tripple-hatted’ HR, and 
the creation of the EEAS, both with the aim of increasing the coherence of the EU 
as an international actor (Piris 2010:243, Laursen 2012: 8, Trombetta 2012:59). 
This section will tackle the abovementioned institutions within the framework of 
CFSP, their competences and consequently the effect on EU coherence in foreign 
policy, and analysed in line with RCI, implying a transferral of competences from 
other actors.  
      The wide policy area of CFSP clearly includes other EU institutions, such as 
the Commission, and member states via the intergovernmental framework of the 
Council. Taking in the RCI assumption that actors have a set of preferences and 
will act accordingly in order to maximize their benefits, within the rules of the 
political game, the likelihood of involved actors in the process leading up to the 
formation of the establishment of the abovementioned novelties, manoeuvred as 
to maximize their self-interest.  
       The pillar structure was, as previously stated, formally removed with the 
Lisbon Treaty. By giving legal uniformity to the EU could have set the 
intergovernmental character of CFSP under serious constrain. However the CFSP 
is still locked in and the Lisbon Treaty clearly distinguish between the EU 
competence under CFSP and its competences in other policy areas, as spelled out 
in the TEU (art. 24:1) the CFSP is “subject to specific rules and procedures”.  
But CFSP competence still remains very limited, and is till predominantly an 
intergovernmental policy, which means that the member states are still the main 
source of influence. One distinct feature to bring up in this regard is the issue of 
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delimination of powers between the EU and member states in CFSP.  Leading up 
to the Lisbon Treaty, during the IGC in 2007, it should be noted that the UK 
secured two declarations locking the intergovernmental nature of CFSP. 
According to Declaration 13 the novelties of the HR and the EEAS must not 
impinge on responsibilities of the member states, clearly formulated as “do not 
affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the 
formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national 
representation in third countries and international organisations.”(Declarations 
2007, art. 13) 
The European Council is accordingly set to define EU’s general political 
directions and priorities, and as is explicitly stated in the Lisbon Treaty in relation 
to CFSP matters: 
 
The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy, including for matters with defence implications.  
(TEU art. 26) 
 
      With the above reasoning it is clearly still the member states that play the key 
role in setting the scene and providing guidelines. In relation to the assumption 
within RCI, of actors as strategists, one can assume that this reflects the 
unwillingness of letting go of state sovereignty in the traditionally state-centred 
competence of foreign policy. Building on this provision, the political orientation 
for the establishment of the EEAS according to the foreign ministers of the 
member states within the Council reflects a continuation of their preferences  
 
The creation of the EEAS is aimed at enabling greater coherence and efficiency in the 
EU’s external action and increasing its political and economic influence in the world. 
(Council Press Release 26 April 2012).  
 
       Because of the fact that member states are still the main actors, in terms of 
RCI reasoning, they evidently aim for greater coherence of the EU as an 
international actor in order to prove its legitimacy and effectiveness on the 
international stage. This reasoning is furthermore reflected in the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy: “… becoming more strategic 
in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most 
successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner …” (2008:2). Also, 
taking into account that the (possible) benefits of change, i.e. of increased 
coherence as an international security actor, outweighs the political cost of 
continuing adding points to a track record of incoherent foreign policy and its 
implications. With this reasoning it is assumed that member states are still calling 
the shots on CFSP matters, and therefore, as a Union, decide to change the rules 
of the game by creating opportunities as well as setting constraints on the new 
institutions. Let us therefore turn to the main institutional innovations that came 
with the Lisbon Treaty, i.e. the HR and EEAS.  
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3.3.1 Turf wars over strategic competence or increased coherence?  
Foreign policy competences with the Lisbon Treaty are concentrated in the 
position and office of the HR23. It is the main task of the HR to conduct the EU’s 
CFSP24, and the EEAS is an autonomous body that is to assist her in her work. 
The ‘tripple-hatted’ nature of the HR derives from the fact that it covers the tasks, 
according to previous Treaties, attributed three individuals. These were the HR for 
CFSP/SG of the Council25, the Commissioner for External Affairs, and the 
President of the External Relations Council26 (Piris 2010: 243-244).  
The HR embodies the European interest and member states interests. This 
reveals the aim of increasing coherence in EU foreign policy by incorporating 
supranational and intergovernmental elements into the positions of the HR. The 
appointment of Catherine Ashton as the first HR resulted in diverse reactions. On 
the one hand, it can be considered as strategic safeguarding by the member states, 
by not choosing a HR with a strong personality27 that effectively would strengthen 
the position as such. On the other hand, as she herself hitherto was Commissioner 
for Trade, her previous experience might reflect in her work as being more prone 
to working for European interests. Then again, the HR is appointed by the 
Council, which connotes that she has a special status in the Commission. This in 
combination with the fact that the HR is responsible for overarching coordination 
of Commission’s policies with external dimension might cause some friction with 
other Commissioners. This might however prove to result in a positive balance 
between the foreign policies of the Council and the Commission resulting in 
greater coherence.  
As it stands it is thus up to the HR to coordinate European foreign policy, she 
is to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring consistency between 
different areas of the EU’s foreign policy but also between these and other EU 
policies. This undertaking has been described in the literature as ‘mission 
impossible’ and would be so if not for the new diplomatic service that is to assist 
her (TEU: art. 18:4, Piris 2010: 245-249, Koehler 2010: 67-68, Blockmans – 
Laatsit 2012: 140).  
The EEAS is described as sui generis, and is an autonomous body in terms of 
budget and staff, separate from the Council as well as the Commission 
(Presidency Report 2009: 6). The staff of the EEAS stems from three sources, the 
General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission, and seconded staff 
from national diplomatic services of member states (TEU art. 27:3). This set-up of 
staffing is in line with RCI reasoning on reducing collective action problems as to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 Catherine Ashton was formally appointed as the first HR under the Lisbon Treaty, 1 December 2009, she was 
previously Commissioner for Trade.  
24 as well as CSDP.  
25 In practice it was Javier Solana who had been SG/HR since 1999, and in many ways was the ’voice’ of the EU 
on the international scene.  
26 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member state exercising the six-month rotating Presidency of the 
Council.  
27 On her appointment some of the criticism was her lack of visible experience for the post.  
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cutting transaction costs among actors as well as between institutions. However it 
could also be considered as a selective incentive, of enabling the main institutions 
affected in handing over competence to a new institution, for career opportunities.  
An interesting note to be made is that Catherine Ashton was formally 
appointed the post of HR in 2009, a year before the launch of the EEAS. The 
treaty provisions on the EEAS were quite vaguely formulated (TEU art. 27), and 
it was up to the HR to present a proposal for a Council Decision on the set-up and 
functioning of the service. Consequently a debate on the institutional setup of the 
EEAS followed, most notably from the member states28.  
Relating this to the RCI approach of maximizing one’s self-interest, HR 
Ashton could be quite instrumental to organisational and strategic features of the 
EEAS in her proposal for a Council Decision on the service. The Swedish 
Presidency presented a report in 2009 with guidelines for the HR as preparation 
for the proposal of Council Decision29. Additional to the scope of the service to 
assist the HR in her work, the EEAS is: 
 
To ensure the consistency and better coordination of the Union's external action, the 
EEAS should also assist the President of the European Council and the President as 
well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of 
external relations as well as closely cooperate with the Member States. 
(Presidency Report 2009:2) 
  
Other actors were thus also involved in the preparatory work of the 
institutional features of the EEAS, e.g. member states and the Commission. And 
the quote above reflects safeguarding of certain elements, as well as an important 
note on the coherence at the top levels of EU foreign policy. In line with previous 
comment on RCI reasoning of weighing costs and benefits, clearly emphasising 
the role of the EEAS in cooperating with other institutions as well as member 
states to ensure coherence of EU external action. In addition, it is stipulated that 
the EEAS ”should play a leading role in the strategic decision-making” (2009:4) 
in order to assist the HR in her responsibilities of coordination and coherence in 
EU foreign policies. This could however lead to the perception and a distinction 
between the EEAS and the Commission, the former considered as the 
programming and decision-making body and the latter as implementation body. 
Another key phrase mentioned twice in the Council Decision on establishing the 
functioning of the EEAS, is that the service is to support the HR ‘without 
prejudice to the normal tasks’ of the Commission30 (2010: art. 1 and 2:1).  
      An exclamation mark related to RCI reasoning and the various actors 
involved, what might prove difficult for the service as it entails serving and 
balancing many political masters, is just this inter-institutional character, with 
staff from backgrounds in national diplomatic services and the Commission, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
28 But also raised voices coming from the European Parliament.  
29 The Presidency Report was later adopted in a Council decision  
30 And the General Secretariat of the Council.  
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operating self-strategically. It could prove to be a continuation of the debacle of 
intergovernmental versus communitaire debate.  
3.4 Sociological Institutionalism – isomorphic 
change of EU foreign policy? 
Focus in SI is the institutional environment but also that actors develop and 
redefine goals, adapting to environmental context. This approach differs to the 
previous sections on HI and RCI in the sense that emphasis is more on norms and 
ideas rather than materialistic notions.  
During the early twenty-first century the EU, as well as its member states, 
responded to international transitions with uncertainty. This was evident in the 
wake of the Iraq crisis. The question of uncertainty was palpable, and the need for 
the EU to deliver coherently, as other significant actors on the international arena, 
became crystal clear. The European Security Strategy31 issued in 2003, reflected 
the need for a framework to resolve internal differences, wherein the EU 
presented its global strategy, and the aim to promote an international order based 
on effective multilateralism32. The Strategy further reveals a shared foundation for 
negotiations with other states and organizations on important issues (ESS 2003:9). 
In accordance with SI reasoning, the rapidly changing environment of today’s 
world of increasing interconnectedness, the argument that institutions need to 
follow suit in order to keep up is easily made. Not only to improve coherence and 
efficiency but also to reflect societal reality and thereby gaining legitimacy. This 
logic is reflected in the follow-up report to the European Security Strategy in 
2008, presented to the European Council, by Javier Solana:  
 
The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces 
pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come 
under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-
making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, 
and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no 
substitute for common solutions. 
(European Council 2008:12) 
 
In SI reasoning, The Constitutional Treaty could reflect an institutional change 
of mimetic isomorphism, where an institution (the EU) identifies and adapt to 
environmental context. Particularly with reference to the inclusion of the term 
Minister For Foreign Affairs, and EU flag (Draft Treaty Constitution for Europe 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
31 The US has traditionally presented a National Security Strategy, and consequently it has been argued that the 
reason why the EU also decided it must have one was as to being an international security actor, setting the 
agenda, not only the US.  
32 Traditionally the term multilateralism is referred to international cooperation between three or more states. 
  33 
2003:157), revealing strife for parable to other actors’ foreign policy 
organizational structures. Taken together with the EU increasingly taking part in 
(other) international organisations, and multilateral settings. Nevertheless, the 
Constitutional Treaty proved a step too far in this regard.  
The Lisbon Treaty conveys significant focus on institutional aspects of reform 
in order to improve coherence of the EU as an international actor. The purpose of 
the ‘tripple hatted’ HR is to increase visibility but also stability in matters of 
external representation in CFSP (Piris 2010: 245, 256), Another bridge it is 
supposed to build is consistency between sectors of EU foreign policies. Since 
norms and ideas work through processes of socialisation, according to SI, this 
institutional design of the triple-hatted HR could be an example of how actors 
(HR) can develop while making decisions as she continuously adapts to 
environmental context and pressures, i.e. other EU institutions and member states.   
In line with SI logic, institutions shape actors’ perceptions, the institutional 
novelty EEAS might thus provide the right organizational framework, a platform 
for cooperation and access to resources, through which actors can achieve sought 
improvement. Furthermore it has the possibility of bridging the supranational and 
intergovernmental gap by creating a ‘foreign policy culture’ in line with SI 
reasoning of normative isomorphism, i.e. providing methods for the service that 
address the shortcomings of coherence in EU foreign policy up to date. 
Also part of the service is EU delegations, which as of 2009 the Commission 
delegations transformed into, and are now representing the EU in the multilateral 
fora, even in CFSP matters (Emerson et.al 2011:13). Accordingly, “The Head of 
Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative of the EEAS, 
and shall be responsible for their execution” (Council Decision 2010 art. 5:3). 
The EU has, over time, obtained a formal position in international institutions, 
whether it is as a full member or as an observer. In general, it is said that with 
participation in an international organisation follows participation in its organs, 
which among other things, entails the right to attend meetings, and exercising 
speaking rights. In line with SI the EU delegations therefore might build on the 
‘culture of foreign policy’ culture, as actors develop and redefine goals while 
making decisions and adapting to environmental pressures.  
External coherence is related to visibility and how the EU projects itself in a 
multilateral setting. With this follows the legitimacy of the EU as an actor on the 
international arena, and if the EU performs coherently it is perceived as a more 
credible partner in a multilateral setting which according to SI is a driving force 
for change. Legitimate, one could say reflects the EU’s ability to adopt a common 
foreign policy, as it is, in a sense analogue to adopting a common internal EU 
policy. (Wessel 2011:623) (Frieden 2004: 262, Gebhard 2011:108-109).  
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4 Case: EU at the OSCE 
The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with … the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
 (TFEU art. 220:1) 
 
In this chapter a brief introduction to EU as an international actor in other 
international organizations, specifically in the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, followed by EU’s presence in the organization. Based on 
the already stated fact that pre-Lisbon the EU lacked in coherence as an 
international security actor, the purpose here is to illustrate with some descriptive 
statistics how the EU acts in an international organization, and might be perceived 
by others, post Lisbon.  
4.1 The EU as an international security actor in 
(other) international organisations 
The EU has not only increased its participation in international regimes in various 
policy fields, but also the institutionalisation of EU involvement in other 
international organisations. By participating in formal international institutions, 
the EU’s visibility as an international security actor increases distinctively 
(Blavoukos – Bourantonis 2011:1-2.  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU was expected to 
speak with one voice in international organisations. Since there is no longer the 
confusion for the rest of the world of being confronted with both the European 
Community and the European Union as international actors. 
According to TEU art. 24:1:  
 
The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall 
cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security 
 
However in the autumn of 2011, some altercations between member states of 
the EU in multilateral organizations took place that stemmed from a general 
dispute over EU competence in foreign policy. Previously, EU statements had 
been given on behalf of “the EU” in international organizations. With the Lisbon 
Treaty however, a clearer distinction of competences had been made. Specifically, 
it called for a distinction between three types of competence: first, the exclusive 
competence of the Union, second the competence of the member states and third 
the shared competence of the Union and the Member States (TFEU art. 3-6). 
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Accordingly, the interpretation of the Treaty differs with reference to issues of 
mixed competence where both the EU and individual member states have 
jurisdiction. The UK believed the EU increasingly to be speaking on the basis of 
EU statements in international organizations, even on issues considered to be a 
matter of national competence (Delaere – Van Schaik 2012: 3, 15-16). It went as 
far that several of EU statements in international organizations33 could not be 
delivered since no agreement on the ‘signatory’ of the statements could be 
reached (The Guardian, 20 October 2011, Der Spiegel, 5 December 2011). 
This dispute over competence resulted in the adoption of a Council Decision 
in October 2011, on general arrangements concerning EU statements in 
multilateral organisations. The practical guidelines clarified as follows:  
 
• If the statement refers exclusively to responsibilities of the EU it should be 
formulated “on behalf of the European Union”.  
• Should the statement refer to responsibilities that concern both EU as well 
as national competence (shared competence), the formulation would be 
“on behalf of the EU and its Member States”.  
• The final option is if the statement refers solely to national competence, it 
should be formulated “on behalf of the Member States of the European 
Union” (Council Decision 2011: 3-4)34.  
4.1.1 EU at the OSCE 
There are several models of how the EU and member states participate and 
represented in international organisations. The most prevalent, and also the one in 
focus here, is where all member states are full members and the EU is an 
observer. In the case of the EU at the OSCE, as an observer, however the political 
reality is that the EU is a major participant (Emerson et. al. 2011:32, 99).  
      The EU has strong historical links to OSCE, since it played a key role in the 
establishment of the organization in the 1970s. It was coordination between the 
member states in the framework of the EPC in a cross-bloc dialogue. The result 
was the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 that set the basic agreements on human rights, 
and established a forum for cooperation between blocs across Cold War Europe. 
The OSCE today holds 57 participating states, from Europe, North America, and 
Central Asia. In the process of encouraging democratization the OSCE played a 
significant role in ending the Cold War.  
      The OSCE approach to security is broad and incorporates three baskets: 
politico-military, economic and environmental and the human dimension (van 
Ham 2006: 29, Stewart 2008: 267, Pourchot 2011:180-181). Today, the EU 
currently almost make up half of the participating states, and contribute more than 
two-thirds of the OSCE budget.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
33 Including at the UN, the OECD, WHO, IAEA and the OSCE. 
34 Emphasis using bold letters my own.  
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      EU competence in OSCE falls under CFSP and CFSD, and as already stated 
has observer role. However, the function of a ’virtual member’ in the sense that it 
has the right to participate, but without a vote or ’member state’ status. Before the 
entry into force of Lisbon, the EU was represented by the Commission as observer 
with the rotating Presidency as spokesperson and coordinator of positions 
(Emerson et. al. 2011: 33, 99). 
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics on EU statements at the OSCE 
Political and decision-making bodies include Summits, Ministerial Councils, 
Permanent Council (PC), Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), and an 
Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF). The present study focus on meetings 
in the PC as well as in the FSC, both bodies hold meetings once a week.  
Below is consolidated data on EU statements from 2011 up until 16th May 
2013, in both PC as well as FSC meetings. As the three tables reveal, the different 
variations of EU competence through how it is presented are clarified, as was the 
result of the dispute over competence.  
4.1.2.1. Permanent Council 
The graph below reveals a decrease in statements on the basis of exclusively EU 
responsibilities, and an increase in statements on the basis of shared competence 
between the EU and the member states. Whereas the formulation based solely on 
national competence occured once, so far, in 2013 (barely distinguishable in the 
graph). A closer look at this statement reveals that it concerns the budget of the 
OSCE. Since the EU does not contribute, but rather the member states 
individually it falls under the basis of national competence.  
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The next graph shows EU statements in the PC on a monthly basis. One note 
to be made in regard to this graph is that there are no meetings held in August, 
hence the absence of data from this month. The Council Decision in October 2011 
is reflected in the graph below showing an increase in the use of shared 
competence from that moth on. However, two statements based on shared 
competence were given before the Council Decision was taken.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Forum for Security Cooperation 
The graph below from FSC meetings reveal a distinctive increase in statements on 
the basis of shared competence between the EU and the member states. More 
specifically there is an absolute as well as a relative increase in the statements 
based on share competence. The relative increase from the year 2011 was 1 out of 
19 statements on shared competence, to 15 out of 26 statements on shared 
competence in 2012.  
      Furthermore the formulation based solely on national competence was used 
three times in 2012. A closer look at these three statements reveals a common 
denominator, namely the Vienna Document, which is based on negotiations of 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. The Document requires (among 
other provisions) participating States to share information on their military forces, 
equipment and defence planning (OSCE official website). This subject is hence 
sensitive for states as this competence traditionally been subscribed to states 
alone.  
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After reviewing the above graphs from PC as well as FSC, the question is whether 
it reflects a coherent EU as an international security actor, or if it further 
contributes to a notion of incoherence. An observation, due to the new provisions 
on how EU gives statements in multilateral organizations, it is a clear change to 
how it was pre-Lisbon. Looking at these graphs, providing an example of the 
coherence of the EU as an international actor, the result rather reflects 
incoherence. 
      The Lisbon Treaty provided for a classification of competences, which 
allowed for a better control of the respect of the subsidiarity principle between EU 
institutions (Piris 2010: 76), but also clearly opened up for a questioning and 
clarification between what is EU competence, shared and exclusively national 
competence. Since the list of exclusive competences and supporting competences 
are exhaustive in the TFEU (art. 3 and 6), but the list of shared competence is not 
exhaustive and states:  
 
“The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer         
it on a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Article 3 and 6” 
      (TEU art. 4) 
 
Consequently, it implies that the CFSP as is set out separately in TFEU art. 
2:4 belong to the category of shared competences.  
 
The EU is thus still struggling with accommodating internal differences. 
Because of a change in how the EU presents itself when giving statements, how 
other actors perceive this in other international organisations, one can only 
speculate. An obvious fall back would be if the EU showed a decrease in 
statements, as an absent EU would clearly signify a divided EU.  
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5 Conclusions 
The take of this thesis was to provide a dialogue between the three approaches of 
new institutionalism, HI, RCI and SI, specifically how they would explain recent 
institutional changes to European foreign policy. Because they provide for the 
basic assumption that institutions matter and therefrom take on different storylines 
on institutional change, each focusing on different processes within the story. 
Therefore they should not be considered conflicting, but more as theoretical 
encounters that provide for a more nuanced reading of various focal points that 
might prove complimentary rather than contradictory.  
HI reasoning on institutional change, with the formalization of EPC through 
the SEA was a first step on this new historical path of cooperation on European 
foreign policy. However the sensitiveness of the matter resulted in the importance 
of timing and sequence. As is reflected in the treaty revisions that followed. But 
also a self-enforcing process wherein the core of initial policy decisions persists 
throughout the course of time with increasing returns in forms of continuity. An 
example of this, of course is the gap between the economic and political 
dimension of the EU that has divided areas of competences but also the problem 
that follows with that many policy areas not only fall under one set of 
competences. The various treaty revisions have shown an upgrade through a 
process of learning with focus on stability and continuity.  
HI on this basis offers an explanation based on intermediating factors rather 
than going to the underlying sources of institutional change. One could argue 
though that it offers a balanced and adequate reading of the institutional change 
that the EU has undergone throughout the years concerning its foreign policy and 
actor on the international scene. 
The RCI approach to institutional change in European foreign policy, with 
special focus on the novelties of HR and EEAS, revealed the importance of actors 
partaking in the institutionalization process, especially strategic safeguarding of 
competence for involved actors. For member states it was by upholding strategic 
competence for the purpose of not letting go of traditionally state-centred foreign 
policy. Not in contrast however with the fact of member states also aiming for 
greater coherence for the EU as an international security actor since that entail 
legitimacy on the international stage.  
All in all, with RCI reasoning, the question whether the EEAS will contribute 
to increased coherence in EU foreign policy will rely on a number of factors. It 
depends on the willingness of the member states to send qualified staff at different 
levels to the service. But also whether the other EU institutions welcome the new 
Service with open arms. The Lisbon institutional innovations for EU’s foreign 
policy are a useful toolkit, however as the main actors it is up to the member 
states to use it. Whether it is for the purpose of a true European foreign policy in 
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its own right, or to use it to serve national strategic interests. With regard to HR 
Ashton, it is splendid to have a single voice, however it requires a single mind 
backing it up. It is not always the loudest voice that makes a difference, but rather 
the one able to convey a clear message. 
According to SI logic, institutions should reflect societal environment, and 
institutions shape actors perceptions, hence the organizational framework of 
EEAS might provide a platform for cooperation and access to resources needed in 
order to improve coherence for the EU as an international security actor.  
The ability for the EU to improve coherence in CFSP matters has improved 
with the Lisbon Treaty, especially so with the establishment of HR, and the 
creation of the EEAS and the EU delegations. With more efficient structures and 
political will, it provides with institutional as well as legal instruments to progress 
the functioning of CFSP and the role of the EU as an international security actor. 
One might put an exclamation mark to the possibility of incoherence resulting 
from introducing new institutions that might undermine the efforts to actually 
increase coherence. This is however not yet discernible.   
EU foreign policy coherence is related to how the EU presents itself to third 
parties, for example in other multilateral organisations and hence great importance 
to how the EU is perceived by other partners. For this reason the follow-up case 
study of EU foreign policy provided some useful insight. The Council decision 
that specified provisions for how the EU is to present itself in multilateral 
organizations stemmed from a dispute on the issue of competence. The result was 
consequently a change in how the EU presents itself, and illuminates a divide that 
was left open by the Lisbon Treaty and therefore resulted in a crack in need of 
repair. The presented graphs unveil incoherence if compared to how the 
provisions for EU statements were pre-Lisbon.  
The point to be made here is, even though the main aim of the Lisbon Treaty 
was to increase coherence of EU as an international actor, with introduced 
mechanisms in order to facilitate this process, the EU is at the end of the day a 
most complex foreign policy actor. 
5.1 Further research 
Several questions has come to my attention during the course of this research that 
I believe would prove very interesting topics for research in their own right.  
One angle to take would be using new institutionalism focusing solely on the 
institutional setup of the office of the HR. Her various roles, responsibilities and 
relations with other EU institutions. Because of the uniqueness of this new 
position, encompassing tasks of previously three positions in their own right.   
Another possible research topic would be to conduct interviews in multilateral 
organizations, with EU diplomats on the development of the EU in multilateral 
setting since Lisbon, but also conducting interviews with non-EU members and 
how the EU is perceived as an international actor from the outside.  
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6 Executive summary  
The executive summary is structured according to the disposition of the thesis.  
 
6.1 Aim and research problem 
The aim of this paper is, by using the three approaches of new institutionalism, to 
explain the institutional development of the EU as an international security actor. 
The type of institutional change in focus is a change in competence introduced 
with the Lisbon Treaty.  
The thesis is thus guided by the following research questions:  
 
− How does the three approaches of new institutionalism explain 
institutional change in EU foreign policy?  
− Given that institutions matter, how has a change in competence affected the 
coherence of the EU as an international security actor?   
6.2 Methodology 
The course of action for this study incorporates two methodologies, qualitative 
and quantitative – thus a mixed method design. The purpose of this thesis is a 
technical approach to combining methodologies, and views these two as 
compatible. Both qualitative and quantitative research incorporates goals of 
describing and explaining. 
The first part of the thesis is a descriptive case study of institutional change to 
the EU external representation post Lisbon, the HR, and the EEAS through the 
lenses of three approaches of new institutionalism. 
The second part is then applied and used a step further down the abstraction 
ladder, to the EU presence at the OSCE, where EU statements in the decision-
making bodies of Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation at the 
OSCE are examined. 
Primary (Treaty texts, Council decisions, statements) as well as secondary 
sources will be used in this study.  
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6.3 Theoretical framework 
The three approaches of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are explored in 
this thesis.  
As is revealed by its name, HI focus is historically based analysis in order to 
reveal why actors emphasize certain preferences above others. Continuity is 
central to HI and path dependency is a self-enforcing process that might encounter 
a hiccup due to critical junctures.   
RCI focus on materialistic structures, and the rules of the political game. Self-
interested actors with a set of preferences then decide to change institutions if they 
become dysfunctional or do not generate optimum results.  
The third approach, SI focus on how actors seek to act appropriate and bestow 
a shared understanding of what is true and reasonable. It considers institutional 
change as a natural process.  
6.4 Analysis 
6.4.1 Historical Institutionalism – path dependence en route? 
HI seeks to explain institutional choices, and the development of institutions over 
time. The importance of timing and sequence in HI, reflects why the original 
informal EPC framework was bound by several restrictions, such as no formal 
links with the European Community, neither with the EC Commission. The 
Luxembourg report was the springboard for formalizing EPC and coherence was 
firstly expressed in the SEA in 1987.  
The concept of path dependence and the fact that HI emphasize order and 
stability, the institutionalization of EPC in the SEA was a first step on this path 
towards common European foreign policy, and the notion of coherence was 
introduced to balance the internal market with a foreign policy dimension. 
HI view initial institutional and policy decisions to be ‘sticky’, the competence 
divisions, and the tensions that came with it, between the Community and the 
EPC (later CFSP) have more or less been constant since the institutionalization of 
EPC through the SEA in 1986.  
6.4.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism – a clear-cut strategy for EU 
competence in foreign policy? 
According to RCI actors decide to change institutions as they become 
dysfunctional or do note generate optimum results. The two main institutional 
changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty in the area of European foreign policy 
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the ‘tripple-hatted’ HR, and the creation of the EEAS, both with the aim of 
increasing the coherence of the EU as an international actor and in line with RCI 
reasoning implying a transferral of competence from other actors. The process 
leading up to the creating of these institutional novelties, assuming set preferences 
of actors manoeuvred in order to maximize self-interest.  
Based on RCI reasoning on Treaty texts it is the member states that play the 
key role in setting the scene and providing guidelines for general political 
guidelines and priorities. In relation to the assumption within RCI, of individuals 
as strategists, one can assume that this reflects the unwillingness of letting go of 
state sovereignty in the traditionally state-centred competence of foreign policy. 
6.4.3 Sociological Institutionalism – isomorphic change of EU 
foreign policy? 
According to SI, institutional environment and actors develop and redefine goals. 
The argument put forward is that EU institutions need to keep up with the 
changing world order to increase coherence but also to uphold legitimacy as an 
international actor.  
The institutional novelty of EEAS might, according to SI, provide for the right 
organizational framework and a platform for cooperation creating a ‘foreign 
policy culture’. Specifically providing methods for the service that address the 
shortcomings of coherence in EU foreign policy.  
6.5 Case: EU at the OSCE 
This chapter provides a case example of how the EU acts in an international 
organization, namely the OSCE. Based on the already stated fact that pre-Lisbon 
the EU lacked in coherence as an international security actor, it is here illustrated 
with some descriptive statistics how the EU acts in an international organization, 
and might be perceived by others, post Lisbon.  
     A dispute over competence resulted in the adoption of a Council Decision in 
October 2011, on general arrangements concerning EU statements in multilateral 
organisations. The consequences and result of this decisions is presented in graphs 
on compiled data of EU statements held at the Permanent Council and Forum for 
Security Cooperation at the OSCE.  
      Due to the new provisions on how EU gives statements in multilateral 
organizations, it is a clear change to how it was pre-Lisbon. Looking at these 
graphs, providing an example of the coherence of the EU as an international actor, 
the result rather reflects incoherence. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
This thesis has provided for an encounter between the three approaches of new 
institutionalism on the institutional change of European foreign policy. More 
specifically, how a change in competence post Lisbon has affected the coherence 
of the EU as an international security actor. Because HI, RCI and SI provide for 
the basic assumption that institutions matter and therefrom take on different 
storylines on institutional change, each focusing on different processes within the 
story these should be viewed as fruitful encounters for explaining institutional 
change.  
HI focuses on the historical process of institutional change, especially the 
importance of timing and sequence to the process of institutional development 
that the European foreign policy cooperation has undergone that began its path 
dependence with the formalization of EPC through the SEA. With RCI reasoning, 
the question whether the EEAS will contribute to increased coherence in EU 
foreign policy will rely on a number of factors. It depends on the willingness of 
the member states to send qualified staff at different levels to the service. But also 
whether the other EU institutions welcome the new Service with open arms. 
According to SI logic, institutions should reflect societal environment, and 
institutions shape actors perceptions, hence the organizational framework of 
EEAS might provide a platform for cooperation and access to resources needed in 
order to improve coherence for the EU as an international security actor.  
The follow-up case study reveals, due to new provisions for the EU on giving 
statements in multilateral organizations, a step towards incoherence.  
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